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Clewis v. Texas, 35 U.S.L. Week 4371 (April 24, 1967).
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning
the admissibility of statements or confessions into evidence have
sharply curtailed haphazard interrogation procedures. As courts
have become more punctilious about "due process" and other
constitutional guarantees, a greater degree of care and fairness
has been demanded in soliciting information and advising un-
informed individuals of their rights.
The principal case, an April 24 decision, represents one more
step toward the guaranteeing of fairness and equality of consti-
tutional protection for all. A pre-Miranda decision,' the case
holds that coercive tactics used by the police to elicit a confession
render the confession inadmissible.
Petitioner (Marvin Peterson Clewis) appealed from a con-
viction of murder for strangling his wife. During the course of
his trial,2 he moved to exclude from evidence three statements
made by him while in custody.
Clewis was taken into custody and held for over 38 hours
before he was brought before a magistrate. Three separate con-
fessions were elicited from Clewis, and he was never advised of
any of his constitutional rights, except that he was warned that
the third confession, if signed, might be used as evidence against
him. There were great discrepancies in the first two confessions.
For example, the accused admitted shooting his wife, when in
fact she was strangled. Clewis was not told of his right to re-
main silent and to have an attorney appointed for him if he
could not afford one.
3
1 The trial of this case was prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966)
the court denied retroactive effect to the principles proclaimed in the
Miranda case.
2 In Toland v. United States, 365 F. (2d) 304 (1966) at p. 306 the court de-
clared, "(F)ailure to make objection to evidence either before or at trial
precludes consideration of objections thereto on appeal. .. ."
3 "The State contends that Clewis did consult with an attorney on Thurs-
day morning." (Clewis was taken into custody on the previous Sunday at
6:00 a.m.) "He insists the conference took place on Friday morning. ...
(T)he only subject discussed with the lawyer was the matter of a fee, and
that the lawyer declined to represent him." P. 4372 of 35 L.W.
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RECENT CASES
The Supreme Court stated that "the trial of this case was
prior to the date of decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966) the requirements of which, therefore, are not directly
applicable." 4
The court nevertheless reversed the case, stating that among
the factors compelling the conclusion that the petitioner's con-
fession was not voluntarily given were these: During the long
period of custody petitioner was never fully advised that he
could consult with counsel and have counsel appointed if neces-
sary; he was never instructed that he was entitled to remain
silent; and he was never told that anything he said could be
used as evidence against him.5
The court could have reversed merely on the obvious viola-
tion of petitioner's rights under the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.6
An enigma appears to have been raised by the Court's de-
cision in this case. One of the factors determining its outcome
was declared by it not to be decisive. In other cases7 the court
has declined to apply the principles set forth in Miranda and
has stated that they were not applicable to cases tried before
that decision.8 This would seem to be the trend the Supreme
Court has been following. The Clewis case appears to represent
a deviation from this trend, one that in all probability will be
ignored by future Supreme Court decisions. However, as the
matter now stands a shadow has been thrown over the court's
doctrine that Miranda will not apply retroactively.
HOWARD E. MENTZER
4 P. 4371 of 35 L.W.
5 Id. at 4372, citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) and Mi-
randa v. Arizona (supra note 1).
6 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 217 (1960) requires that an accused be taken
before a magistrate "immediately."
7 Davis v. North Carolina (supra note 5) and Johnson v. New Jersey
(supra note 1).
8 Supra note 2.
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